

Thomann, E (2015). Customizing Europe: Transposition as bottom-up implementation. [Journal of European Public Policy 22\(10\): 1368-1387.](#)

Online appendix A: Measurement and calibration of sets

Customization

The customization index is calibrated using the direct method of calibration, which ‘uses a logistic function to fit the raw data in-between the three qualitative anchors at 1 (full membership), 0.5 (point of indifference), and 0 (full non-membership). (...) Because a logistic function is used, the actual anchors are 0.95, 0.5, and 0.05’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 35). The crossover point is chosen at 1.5 to distinguish between more limited than extensive customization and more extensive than limited customization.

EU regulatory mode and issue salience

A responsive regulatory mode takes on the value 0 for inflexible instruments, and 1 for flexible instruments. The indirect method of calibration was used, which involves an initial grouping of cases into previously defined set-membership scores (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 35). A salient issue was explicitly mentioned as subject of discussions; such a high amount of public attention may indicate that it is disputed, or simply that it is granted particular importance. An issue which is salient at the EU level is coded as such for all countries (indirect method of calibration).

Domestic resistance

I construct an added domestic resistance index. The strength of domestic resistance hinges on the

power of the opposed stakeholder groups to successfully influence policy making, which was evaluated by the interviewees for each country (absent (1), medium (2) or significant (3)). The final condition ‘domestic resistance’ is an added index: it is fully given if one of the target group opposes the policy (3) and that group is powerful (sum: 6); and more given than not if a target group opposes the policy, but is only moderately or not influential (sum: 4 or 5). If no one opposes the policy (0), but one of the policy’s target groups is influential, then resistance is mostly (3), and if they are all not or only moderately influential, then fully absent (1 or 2) (indirect method of calibration). For policies with several addressees, the most powerful target group served as point of reference.

Institutions

The degree of decentralization indicates whether the regions have no (1), partial (2) or far-reaching (3) legislative competencies in the area of veterinary drugs regulations (Sager et al 2011: 354). A second dimension refers to the strength of bicameralism (Armingeon et al. 2012) (0: no second chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1: weak, 2: strong).

Decentralization and bicameralism are added into one index of institutional structure (Haverland 2000). Third, corporatism is measured by the Siaroff integration index of the year 1995, ranging from 1 (least integrated) to 5 (most integrated). Since transposition often takes place in administrative bodies, the added veto point index weighs corporatism and institutional structure equally. Corporatist practises, meaning the consultation of stakeholders by the public administration, have proven relevant for the revision of veterinary drugs regulations in the four countries under investigation (Sager et al. 2011). The resulting set ranges from the fewest possible veto points (2) to a veto point index of 8, which is already considered as fully

decentralized. The crossover point is chosen at 5, so that an equal amount of veto points separates it from full membership and full non-membership (direct method of calibration).

The number of veto players stems from Tsebelis' (1995) updated dataset (for 1990 or 2000, depending on the EU directive concerned). Since theoretically, an infinite number of veto players is thinkable, the calibration is based on the cases' empirical distribution, which ranges from 5 to 1; the latter was hence chosen as the smallest possible amount of veto players (full non-membership). The crossover point of 2.75 ensures that only cases with a number of veto players above average (2.4) are conceived as having many of them. Adding an identical distance of 1.75, cases with 4.5 veto players or more are considered full members of the set (direct method of calibration).

Interventionist styles

I classify each domestic policy instrument as sermon (0), carrot (1) or stick (2) according to the degree of authority exercised on its target population (Sager 2009: 540). The aggregated values by country represent the average degree of coerciveness of the national policy instruments for the regulations of a) dispensing and b) administration, since the countries grant different regulatory importance to these two aspects (Sager et al. 2011: 369). Given that policy instruments always come along in mixes (Sager 2009), the calibration is not based on unrealistic scenarios of 'only sticks' or 'only sermons', but on the empirically observed range of coerciveness. It expresses whether the countries' interventionist styles are relatively coercive or not, as compared to the other countries. Accordingly, the crossover point corresponds to the sample mean (1.6), whereas the thresholds for full (non-)membership represent the sample range (direct method of calibration).

Table A1: Measurement and calibration

<i>Set</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Calibration anchors</i>				
		1	0.67	0.5	0.33	0
Extensive customization (CUSTOM)	Added index (0 - 4) of additional <i>density</i> and <i>restrictiveness</i> of domestic regulation as compared to EU directive, each ranging from 0 (absent) over moderate (1) to extensive (2) ¹	4	--	1.5	--	0
Responsive regulatory mode (RESP)	Inflexible instruments (0), flexible instruments (1) ²	1	--	--	--	0
Salient issue (SAL)	Explicitly mentioned public attention yes (1), no (0) ¹ - What issues are stakeholders discussing about? - Problems related to the transposition of European directives?	1	--	--	--	0
Domestic resistance (RES)	Added index of opposition of target group (yes = 3, no = 0) and its power to exert influence (absent = 1, medium = 2, significant = 3) ¹ - Please indicate 2-4 interest groups that are influential in the formulation of veterinary drugs regulations? - How would you rate their power to exert influence (networks with the public administration, political relevance, activities such as, and/or resources for, lobbying at national and European level)?	6	4-5	--	3	1-2
Many veto points (VPO)	Added index of a) institutional structure (from 1 to 5, with 2 dimensions: decentralization ¹ (1-3) and bicameralism ³ (0-2)), and b) corporatism ³ (from 1 (centralized) to 5 (fragmented))	8	--	5	--	2
Many veto players (VPL)	Number of institutional and partisan veto players in 1990 or 2000, depending on EU directive concerned ⁴	4.5	--	2.75	--	1
Coercive interventionist style (COERC)	Average share of sermons (0), carrots (1) and sticks (2) in national regulations (aggregated separately for dispensing and administration regulations) ¹	2	--	1.6	--	1

Sources : ¹Sager et al. (2011).

²Directives 2001/82/EC, 90/167/EEC, 2006/130/EC

³Armingeon et al. (2012).

⁴Tsebelis (1995), updated veto player dataset.

Online appendix B: supplementary tables

Table B1: Policies, EU legal basis and target groups

	<i>Policy id</i>	<i>Policy content</i>	<i>EU directive</i>	<i>Regulatory mode</i>
<i>Dispensing</i>	D1	Requirement of clinical examination of animals prior to prescribing drug ^{1,3}	90/167/EEC ⁴	FI
	D2	Actors authorized to dispense prescription drugs ^{1,2}	2001/82/EC ⁵	FI
	D3	Actors authorized to dispense medicated feedingstuffs ¹	90/167/EEC	II
	D4	Amount of prescription drugs which may be dispensed ^{1,3}	2001/82/EC	FI
	D5	Amount of medicated feedingstuffs which may be dispensed ^{1,3}	90/167/EEC	II
	D6	Dispensing categories ^{1,2}	2001/82/EC	FI
	D7	Dispensing rights of veterinarians and pharmacies exceeding the mere distribution of drugs ^{1,2}	2001/82/EC	FI
	D8	Required duration of storage of dispensing documentation, by whom ^{1,2,3}	2001/82/EC	II
	D9	Required duration of storage of prescription and by whom ^{1,3}	2001/82/EC	II
	D10	Actors authorized to manufacture drugs which do not require a market authorization ^{1,2,3}	2001/82/EC	FI
	D11	Medicated feedingstuffs require a prescription on a standardized form ^{1,3}	90/167/EEC	II
	D12	Actors authorized to prescribe veterinary drugs ¹	2001/82/EC	FI
	D13	Exemptions from prescription requirement ^{1,2}	2006/130/EC ⁶	FI
<i>Administration</i>	A1	Actors who may administer the drug used off-label ^{1,3}	2001/82/EC	II
	A2	Possibilities for off-label use in cases of supply shortage ¹	2001/82/EC	II
	A3	Required duration of storage of administration documentation, by whom ^{1,3}	2001/82/EC	II
	A4	Possibility of on-farm manufacturing of medicated feedingstuffs for livestock owners ³	90/167/EEC	FI
	A5	Is top dressing (manual adding of drug into feed) allowed? ³	90/167/EEC	FI
	A6	Withdrawal periods ^{1,3}	2001/82/EC	II

Principal target groups: ¹veterinarians, ²pharmacies, ³livestock holders

⁴Council Directive 90/167/EEC of 26 March 1990 laying down the conditions governing the preparation, placing on the market and use of medicated feedingstuffs in the Community.

⁵Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products.

⁶Commission Directive 2006/130/EC of 11 December 2006 implementing Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the establishment of criteria for exempting certain veterinary medicinal products for food-producing animals from the requirement of a veterinary prescription.

FI = flexible instrument.

II = inflexible instrument.

Table B2: Necessary conditions for extensive and limited customization

Condition	CUSTOM		custom	
	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>
RESP	0.669	0.698	0.351	0.301
resp	0.330	0.383	0.648	0.616
SAL	0.587	0.598	0.480	0.401
sal	0.412	0.491	0.519	0.508
RES	0.604	0.683	0.592	0.550
res	0.602	0.643	0.659	0.578
VPO	0.659	0.706	0.604	0.532
vpo	0.563	0.634	0.666	0.616
VPL	0.473	0.699	0.465	0.564
vpl	0.705	0.616	0.752	0.540
COERC	0.769	0.716	0.626	0.478
coerc	0.439	0.588	0.628	0.691

Consistency threshold for necessary conditions: ≥ 0.9 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 143).

Table B3: Truth table: Analysis of sufficiency for extensive customization

RESP	SAL	RES	VPO	VPL	COERC	CUSTOM	Number	Consistency
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1.000
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	1.000
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	1.000
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	4	1.000
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	1.000
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.993
1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	0.974
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	0.935
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	5	0.919
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	4	0.894
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	0.826
0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.793
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	0.773
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.764
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.669
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.641
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	6	0.640
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	5	0.565
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.549
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.507
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.504
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.470
0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.446
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.434
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.431
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.321

Software: fsQCA 2.5

Prime implicants: RESP*SAL*res*VPO*vpl; resp*res*VPO*coerc OR resp*sal*VPO*coerc OR resp*RES*vpo*VPL

The present data display tied logically redundant prime implicants, i.e. some degree of ambiguity (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 108ff). The alternative intermediate solutions fully overlap with the one chosen for presentation. Additionally, the former contain two or three more redundant paths with unique coverage 0.000, covering cases that are already explained by the other paths. Some alternative complex and parsimonious solutions also contain redundant paths.

Directional expectations: RESP → CUSTOM, SAL → CUSTOM, RES → CUSTOM, VPO → CUSTOM, VPL → CUSTOM.

Full intermediate solution:

sal*COERC*VPL + RESP*SAL*coerc + RESP*VPO*COERC + RESP*SAL*RES + resp*res*VPO*coerc → CUSTOM.

The path resp*res*VPO*coerc has been omitted from Table 1 and from the theory evaluation due to its very low empirical relevance. It only covers one case, a1 au (membership 0.62 in path ,0.65 in CUSTOM). The issue at stake is the question which actors are allowed to administer drugs that were dispensed under the Cascade rule, i.e. when supply shortfalls exist – the EU rule allowing both veterinarians and livestock holders to administer. In such situations, the drugs are either not authorized for the species under question, or not for the indication under question, or both. Austria, as the only country, has forbidden livestock holders to administer in these cases; only veterinarians are allowed to do so. In other countries, the drugs' administration only has to be supervised by a veterinarian, or not at all (UK), and is sometimes restricted to certain types of drugs. Case study material (Sager et al. 2011: 209, 212, 215, 233-238) reveals that the reason for the restrictive Austrian regulation lies in the fact that, due to the

comparatively small size of the veterinary pharmaceutical market, coupled with a high relevance of agriculture in Austria, supply shortfalls for rare indications or species occur more often in Austria than in the other countries. Thus, the Austrian regulators have seen a need to ensure that the use of the Cascade rule occurs under controlled conditions. As such circumstances are more exceptional in the other countries, the latter have tended to differentiate the Cascade rule to allow for some flexibility, rather than rendering it more restrictive. The issue nonetheless has a low salience in Austria, as it is neither subject to particular discussions nor to resistance from livestock holders. In order to do justice to the solution consistency and coverage scores displayed in Table 1, this path has been included in Figure 2.

Complex solution (omission of fully redundant path (s)):

sal*res*VPL*COERC + RESP*SAL*RES*COERC + RESP*SAL*vpo*vpl*coerc + RESP*res*VPO*vpl*COERC + resp*sal*res*VPO*vpl*coerc + RESP*SAL*res*vpl*coerc → CUSTOM (solution consistency 0.878, solution coverage 0.689).

Parsimonious solution (omission of redundant path(s)):

sal*VPL + RESP*SAL + RESP*COERC + resp*res*VPO*coerc → CUSTOM (solution consistency 0.734, solution coverage 0.823).

Limited diversity:

38 out of 64 possible configurations are not observed empirically - ‘a rather common scenario in applied QCA’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 169). 11 (CUSTOM), respectively 4 (custom), of these clustered (not arithmetic) logical remainders served as ‘easy counterfactuals’. The careful use of directional expectations derived from previous Europeanization research has improved the results’ parsimony, while ensuring their plausibility and coherence.

Simplifying assumptions for intermediate solution (11 logical remainders included into logical minimization):

RESP*SAL*res*VPO*VPL*COERC + sal*RES*VPL*COERC + RESP*sal*RES*VPO*COERC + RESP*SAL*VPL*coerc + RESP*SAL*RES*VPO*coerc.

Table B4: Truth table: Analysis of sufficiency for limited customization

RESP	SAL	RES	VPO	VPL	COERC	custom	Number	Consistency
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.000
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1.000
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	1.000
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0.989
1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.985
0	1	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.908
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.868
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.824
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.824
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	5	0.784
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.758
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.751
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	6	0.747
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	0.728
1	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	0.644
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.624
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.617
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.538
1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0.538
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	4	0.526
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0.513
1	0	0	1	0	1	0	5	0.513
1	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.509
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.506
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.482

Software: fsQCA 2.5

Prime implicants: resp*RES*coerc OR resp*RES*vpl*coerc; resp*sal*res*vpo*vpl

The present data display tied logically redundant prime implicants, i.e. some degree of ambiguity (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 108ff). In the analysis for limited customization, this has led to slightly differing complex and parsimonious solutions, with varying redundant paths and consistency and coverage values, depending on the order in which the fsQCA 2.5 software chooses the prime implicants. The intermediate solution, which is interpreted here, remains robust regarding the non-redundant paths displayed in the paper.

Directional expectations: resp → custom, sal → custom, res → custom, vpo → custom, vpl → custom.

Untenable assumptions: sal*VPL + RESP*SAL + RESP*COERC + resp*res*VPO*coerc.

Complex solution (omission of fully redundant path(s)):

sal*res*vpo*vpl*coerc + RESP*sal*res*vpl*coerc + resp*SAL*vpo*VPL*COERC + resp*SAL*RES*VPO*vpl*coerc → custom (solution consistency 0.965, solution coverage 0.377).

Parsimonious solution (under exclusion of untenable assumptions, omission of fully redundant path):

sal*vpo*vpl*coerc + RESP*sal*vpl*coerc + resp*RES*vpl*coerc + resp*SAL*RES*coerc + resp*SAL*vpo*COERC → custom (solution consistency 0.947, solution coverage 0.440).

Simplifying assumptions for intermediate solution (4 logical remainders included into logical minimization):

resp*sal*RES*vpl*coerc + resp*SAL*RES*vpo*vpl + resp*RES*vpo*vpl*coerc.

Table B5: Sufficient conditions for limited customization

<i>Solution</i>	resp* RES*vpl*coerc +	resp*sal* vpo*vpl*coerc +	resp*SAL* vpo*COERC +	RESP*sal* res*vpl*coerc	→ custom
<i>Single case coverage</i>	AU:a2,6, a3	UK:d3,5,11,a1	FR:d5,a2,6	AU:a5 UK:d1,4,a5	
<i>Consistency</i>	0.914	1.000	1.000	0.990	
<i>Raw coverage</i>	0.212	0.129	0.103	0.093	
<i>Unique coverage</i>	0.084	0.059	0.045	0.093	
<i>Solution consistency: 0.952, solution coverage: 0.411</i>					

Bold: contradictory case.

Raw consistency threshold: 0.908. In each of the following three truth table rows, at least 50 per cent of the cases are contradictory cases.

Online appendix C: Theory evaluation

Following Schneider and Wagemann's (2012: 295-305) refinement of Ragin's principles of theory evaluation, the theoretical hunches T can be evaluated by comparing them with the solution terms S . First, T and S are negated. The set $\sim T$ denotes all the scenarios that are not predicted by the theoretical propositions. The set $\sim S$ denotes all the scenarios that were not observed in the solution term. Based on this, three questions can be answered. First, which parts of the theory are supported by the findings? This is, on the one hand, the Boolean intersection $T*S$ – the area in which theory and results overlap. On the other hand, the intersection $\sim T*\sim S$ denotes those scenarios that neither theory nor the results deem sufficient for the outcome. Second, in which directions it should theory be expanded? This is the intersection $\sim T*S$, the hitherto overlooked cases with regard to which the theory should be reformulated. Third, which parts need to be dropped? This is the intersection $T*\sim S$, namely the cases for which theory predicts the occurrence for the outcome but which the solution does not capture, hence suggesting a delimitation of the theory.

Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 300ff) extend this framework by integrating the cases covered by these intersections. First, only cases that have membership in the intersection $T*S$ and also display the outcome Y support the theory. Conversely, cases with $\sim Y$ indicate that both theory and empirics predict the outcome which, however, does not materialize. Second, cases in $\sim T*S$ that display the outcome Y suggest the direction in which theoretical expectations should be extended. Cases with $\sim Y$, however, weaken this need for modification of the theory.

Furthermore, in both intersections with S , logical remainders can materialize, which have no empirical coverage. Third, only cases that display both $T*\sim S$ and $\sim Y$ indicate a delimitation of the theory. Low coverage indicates a low empirical importance to delimit theory. Cases with Y

support theory and weaken the plausibility of the solution. Fourth, if all cases in $\sim T^* \sim S$ also have $\sim Y$, then there is no evidence that contradicts both T and S. Conversely, cases with Y contradict both T and S and indicate that hitherto overlooked explanations for the outcome should be explored.

I apply this technique first for the hypotheses on extensive customization and second for the hypotheses on limited customization (software: TOSMANA). For the sake of reader-friendliness, I use lower-case letter notation instead of the ' \sim ' sign to denote the negation of condition and outcome sets.

In formal terms, H1, H3 and H4 are present the following set relations, where the forward arrow ' \rightarrow ' reads as 'is sufficient for': and ' \leftarrow ' means 'is necessary for':

H1: $RESP \leftarrow CUSTOM$

H3: $SAL * RES * (VPO + VPL) \rightarrow CUSTOM$

H4: $RESP * COERC \rightarrow CUSTOM$

These hypotheses can be resumed into the following expected explanation for extensive customization:

$T(CUSTOM): RESP * SAL * RES * VPO + RESP * SAL * RES * VPL + RESP * COERC \rightarrow CUSTOM$

With the intermediate solution obtained (for complexity reasons, without the path $resp * res * VPO * coerc$) being

$S(CUSTOM): RESP * SAL * coerc + RESP * SAL * RES + sal * VPL * COERC +$

$RESP * VPO * COERC \rightarrow CUSTOM$

I obtain the following set negations:

$\sim T(\text{CUSTOM}): \text{resp} + \text{sal} * \text{coerc} + \text{res} * \text{coerc} + \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} * \text{coerc}$

$\sim S(\text{CUSTOM}): \text{resp} * \text{SAL} + \text{resp} * \text{vpl} + \text{sal} * \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} + \text{sal} * \text{coerc} + \text{SAL} * \text{res} * \text{vpo} * \text{COERC} +$
 $\text{res} * \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} * \text{COERC} + \text{resp} * \text{coerc}$

The resulting intersections are

$T(\text{CUSTOM}) * S(\text{CUSTOM}):$

$\text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{RES} * \text{VPO} + \text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{RES} * \text{VPL} + \text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{RES} * \text{COERC} +$
 $\text{RESP} * \text{sal} * \text{VPL} * \text{COERC} + \text{RESP} * \text{VPO} * \text{COERC}$

$\sim T(\text{CUSTOM}) * S(\text{CUSTOM}):$

$\text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{res} * \text{coerc} + \text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} * \text{coerc} + \text{resp} * \text{sal} * \text{VPL} * \text{COERC}$

$T(\text{CUSTOM}) * \sim S(\text{CUSTOM}): \text{RESP} * \text{sal} * \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} * \text{COERC} + \text{RESP} * \text{SAL} * \text{res} * \text{vpo} * \text{COERC} +$
 $\text{RESP} * \text{res} * \text{vpo} * \text{vpl} * \text{COERC}$

$\sim T(\text{CUSTOM}) * \sim S(\text{CUSTOM}): \text{resp} * \text{SAL} + \text{resp} * \text{vpl} + \text{resp} * \text{coerc} + \text{sal} * \text{coerc}$

These intersections are represented in Figure 3. The combinations of conditions proposed by the hypotheses were factored out.

Furthermore, H2 and H5 are formally represented as:

H2: $\text{resp} \rightarrow \text{custom}$

H5: $\text{resp} * \text{coerc} \rightarrow \text{custom}$

The theoretical expectation for limited customization is hence

$T(\text{custom}): \text{resp} + \text{resp} * \text{coerc} \rightarrow \text{custom}$

The intermediate solution has yielded

$S(\text{custom}): \text{resp}^*\text{RES}^*\text{vpl}^*\text{coerc} + \text{resp}^*\text{sal}^*\text{vpo}^*\text{vpl}^*\text{coerc} + \text{resp}^*\text{SAL}^*\text{vpo}^*\text{COERC} +$
 $\text{RESP}^*\text{sal}^*\text{res}^*\text{vpl}^*\text{coerc} \rightarrow \text{custom}$

Both sets are then negated:

$\sim T(\text{custom}): \text{RESP}$

$\sim S(\text{custom}): \text{RESP}^*\text{RES} + \text{SAL}^*\text{res}^*\text{coerc} + \text{resp}^*\text{res}^*\text{VPO} + \text{sal}^*\text{VPL} + \text{VPL}^*\text{coerc} +$
 $\text{sal}^*\text{COERC} + \text{SAL}^*\text{res}^*\text{VPO} + \text{VPO}^*\text{VPL} + \text{RESP}^*\text{SAL} + \text{VPO}^*\text{COERC} + \text{RESP}^*\text{VPL} +$
 $\text{RESP}^*\text{COERC}$

Based on this, the following intersections are calculated:

$T(\text{custom})^*S(\text{custom}): \text{resp}^*\text{SAL}^*\text{vpo}^*\text{COERC} + \text{resp}^*\text{coerc}^*\text{RES}^*\text{vpl} +$
 $\text{resp}^*\text{coerc}^*\text{sal}^*\text{vpo}^*\text{vpl}$

$\sim T(\text{custom})^*S(\text{custom}): \text{RESP}^*\text{sal}^*\text{res}^*\text{vpl}^*\text{coerc}$

$T(\text{custom})^*\sim S(\text{custom}): \text{resp}^*\text{res}^*\text{VPO} + \text{resp}^*\text{sal}^*\text{VPL} + \text{resp}^*\text{sal}^*\text{COERC} + \text{resp}^*\text{VPO}^*\text{VPL} +$
 $\text{resp}^*\text{VPO}^*\text{COERC} + \text{resp}^*\text{coerc}^*\text{SAL}^*\text{res} + \text{resp}^*\text{coerc}^*\text{VPL}$

$\sim T^*(\text{custom})\sim S(\text{custom}): \text{RESP}^*\text{RES} + \text{RESP}^*\text{SAL} + \text{RESP}^*\text{VPL} + \text{RESP}^*\text{COERC}$

These intersections are represented in Figure 4. The combinations of conditions proposed by the hypotheses were factored out.

Online appendix D: Raw data

Data

Armingeon, K., Careja, R., Weisstanner, D., Engler, S., Potolidis, P. and Gerber, M. (2012)

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Table D1: List of interview partners, legal experts and written statements

<i>Case study</i>	<i>Interviewees</i>	<i>Affiliation of interviewees</i>	<i>Legal expert</i>	<i>Written statements</i>
European Union	G�rard Moulin Wolfgang Trunk Karin Krauss	Heads of Medicines Agencies DG SANCO DG SANCO	Karin Krauss	--
France	Claude Andrillon Arnaud Deleu G�rard Moulin Daniel Parizot	Syndicat National des V�t�rinaires d'Exercice Lib�ral Syndicat de l'Industrie du M�dicament V�t�rinaire et r�actif Agence Nationale du M�dicament V�t�rinaire Groupement de D�fense Sanitaire du Cher – GDS	Claude Andrillon	--
Germany	Prof. Dr. Thomas Blaha Dr. Martin Schneidereit Prof. Dr. Manfred Kietzmann	Stiftung Tier�rztliche Hochschule Hannover Bundesverband f�r Tiergesundheit e.V. Stiftung Tier�rztliche Hochschule Hannover	Prof. Dr. Manfred Kietzmann	Dr. Ute Tietjen, Bundestier�rzttekammer Berlin Dr. Arno Piontkowski, Bundesverband der beamteten Tier�rzte
Austria	Prof. Dr. med. vet. Ivo Schmerold Dr. Marina Mikula Dr. Walter Holzhaacker	Veterin�rmedizinische Universit�t Wien Bundesamt f�r Gesundheit �sterreichische Tier�rzttekammer	Dr. Marina Mikula	Eugen Obermayr, �sterreichische Agentur f�r Gesundheit und Ern�hrungssicherheit Dr. Wilhelm Petracek, �sterreichische Tier�rzttekammer Mag. pharm. Dr. Wolfgang Jasek, �sterreichische Apothekerkammer
United Kingdom	John FitzGerald Dr. Martha Spagnuolo-Weaver Phil Sketchley Catherine McLaughlin	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs National Office of Animal Health National Farmers Union	Caroline Povey, Veterinary Medicines Directorate	Ian Scott, Animal Health Distributors Association John FitzGerald, Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture Alliance

Table D2: Codings of sub-indicators

<i>Country</i>	<i>Power to exert influence of...</i>			<i>Decentrali- zation</i>	<i>Bicameralism</i>	<i>corporatism</i>
	<i>Veterinarians</i>	<i>Pharmacies</i>	<i>Livestock owners</i>			
AU	2	2	3	1	0	4.625
GE	3	1	3	3	2	4.125
FR	2	1	3	1	0	2.25
UK	3	1	3	2	0	2

Table D3: Raw data matrix

<i>Case ID</i>	<i>EU regulatory mode</i>	<i>Issue salience</i>	<i>Domestic resistance index</i>	<i>Veto points</i>	<i>Veto players</i>	<i>Interventionist style</i>	<i>Density</i>	<i>Restrictiveness</i>	<i>Customization index</i>
a1au	0	0	3	5.625	2	1.5	0	2	2
a1fr	0	0	3	3.25	5	1.666	1	1	2
a1ge	0	0	3	9.125	3	1.666	2	1	3
a1uk	0	0	3	4	1	1	0	0	0
a2au	0	1	5	5.625	2	1.5	0	0	0
a2fr	0	1	2	3.25	5	1.666	0	0	0
a2ge	0	1	6	9.125	3	1.666	0	0	0
a2uk	0	1	3	4	1	1	0	0	0
a3au	0	1	5	5.625	2	1.5	1	1	2
a3fr	0	0	3	3.25	5	1.666	1	1	2
a3ge	0	1	6	9.125	3	1.666	1	1	2
a3uk	0	1	3	4	1	1	1	1	2
a4au	1	1	3	5.625	2	1.5	2	1	3
a4fr	1	1	5	3.25	1	1.666	1	2	3
a4ge	1	1	6	9.125	2.42	1.666	0	2	2
a4uk	1	1	3	4	1	1	1	0	1
a5au	1	0	3	5.625	2	1.5	0	0	0
a5fr	1	1	5	3.25	1	1.666	1	2	3
a5ge	1	1	3	9.125	2.42	1.666	2	1	3
a5uk	1	0	3	4	1	1	0	0	0
a6au	0	1	5	5.625	2	1.5	0	0	0
a6fr	0	1	6	3.25	5	1.666	0	0	0
a6ge	0	1	6	9.125	3	1.666	0	0	0
a6uk	0	1	3	4	1	1	0	0	0

d10au	1	1	3	5.625	2	1.923	2	1	3
d10fr	1	1	5	3.25	5	1.692	2	1	3
d10ge	1	1	6	9.125	3	2	1	2	3
d10uk	1	1	3	4	1	1.23	2	1	3
d11au	0	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	0	0	0
d11fr	0	0	3	3.25	1	1.692	0	0	0
d11ge	0	0	3	9.125	2.42	2	0	0	0
d11uk	0	0	3	4	1	1.23	0	0	0
d12au	1	0	2	5.625	2	1.923	0	2	2
d12fr	1	0	2	3.25	5	1.692	0	2	2
d12ge	1	0	3	9.125	3	2	0	2	2
d12uk	1	1	6	4	1	1.23	2	1	3
d13au	1	0	2	5.625	2	1.923	1	2	3
d13fr	1	0	2	3.25	5	1.692	1	2	3
d13ge	1	0	3	9.125	3	2	1	2	3
d13uk	1	1	3	4	1	1.23	1	2	3
d1au	1	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	2	2	4
d1fr	1	1	6	3.25	1	1.692	2	1	3
d1ge	1	0	3	9.125	2.42	2	1	1	2
d1uk	1	0	3	4	1	1.23	1	0	1
d2au	1	1	5	5.625	2	1.923	0	2	2
d2fr	1	1	4	3.25	5	1.692	1	1	2
d2ge	1	1	6	9.125	3	2	0	2	2
d2uk	1	1	6	4	1	1.23	2	0	2
d3au	0	0	2	5.625	2	1.923	0	2	2
d3fr	0	0	2	3.25	1	1.692	0	2	2
d3ge	0	1	4	9.125	2.42	2	0	2	2
d3uk	0	0	3	4	1	1.23	0	1	1
d4au	1	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	1	1	2
d4fr	1	0	3	3.25	5	1.692	0	0	0
d4ge	1	1	6	9.125	3	2	2	2	4
d4uk	1	0	3	4	1	1.23	0	0	0
d5au	0	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	1	1	2
d5fr	0	1	3	3.25	1	1.692	0	0	0
d5ge	0	1	6	9.125	2.42	2	1	2	3
d5uk	0	0	3	4	1	1.23	1	0	1
d6au	1	1	6	5.625	2	1.923	2	1	3
d6fr	1	0	2	3.25	5	1.692	2	1	3
d6ge	1	0	3	9.125	3	2	1	2	3
d6uk	1	1	6	4	1	1.23	2	1	3
d7au	1	1	5	5.625	2	1.923	1	2	3
d7fr	1	0	2	3.25	5	1.692	1	2	3

d7ge	1	1	6	9.125	3	2	2	2	4
d7uk	1	1	3	4	1	1.23	2	0	2
d8au	0	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	0	0	0
d8fr	0	0	3	3.25	5	1.692	0	0	0
d8ge	0	1	6	9.125	3	2	0	0	0
d8uk	0	1	3	4	1	1.23	1	1	2
d9au	0	0	3	5.625	2	1.923	1	2	3
d9fr	0	0	3	3.25	5	1.692	1	2	3
d9ge	0	1	6	9.125	3	2	2	2	4
d9uk	0	1	3	4	1	1.23	1	2	3

Table D4: Fuzzy set scores

<i>Case ID</i>	RESP	SAL	RES	VPO	VPL	COERC	CUSTOM
a1au	0	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,65
a1fr	0	0	0,33	0,15	0,98	0,62	0,65
a1ge	0	0	0,33	0,98	0,61	0,62	0,86
a1uk	0	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,05
a2au	0	1	0,67	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,05
a2fr	0	1	0	0,15	0,98	0,62	0,05
a2ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,62	0,05
a2uk	0	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,05
a3au	0	1	0,67	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,65
a3fr	0	0	0,33	0,15	0,98	0,62	0,65
a3ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,62	0,65
a3uk	0	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,65
a4au	1	1	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,86
a4fr	1	1	0,67	0,15	0,05	0,62	0,86
a4ge	1	1	1	0,98	0,36	0,62	0,65
a4uk	1	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,27
a5au	1	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,05
a5fr	1	1	0,67	0,15	0,05	0,62	0,86
a5ge	1	1	0,33	0,98	0,36	0,62	0,86
a5uk	1	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,05
a6au	0	1	0,67	0,65	0,22	0,38	0,05
a6fr	0	1	1	0,15	0,98	0,62	0,05
a6ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,62	0,05
a6uk	0	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,05	0,05
d10au	1	1	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,86
d10fr	1	1	0,67	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,86
d10ge	1	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,86
d10uk	1	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,86
d11au	0	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,05
d11fr	0	0	0,33	0,15	0,05	0,67	0,05
d11ge	0	0	0,33	0,98	0,36	0,95	0,05
d11uk	0	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,05
d12au	1	0	0	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,65
d12fr	1	0	0	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,65

d12ge	1	0	0,33	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,65
d12uk	1	1	1	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,86
d13au	1	0	0	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,86
d13fr	1	0	0	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,86
d13ge	1	0	0,33	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,86
d13uk	1	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,86
d1au	1	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,95
d1fr	1	1	1	0,15	0,05	0,67	0,86
d1ge	1	0	0,33	0,98	0,36	0,95	0,65
d1uk	1	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,27
d2au	1	1	0,67	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,65
d2fr	1	1	0,67	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,65
d2ge	1	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,65
d2uk	1	1	1	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,65
d3au	0	0	0	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,65
d3fr	0	0	0	0,15	0,05	0,67	0,65
d3ge	0	1	0,67	0,98	0,36	0,95	0,65
d3uk	0	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,27
d4au	1	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,65
d4fr	1	0	0,33	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,05
d4ge	1	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,95
d4uk	1	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,05
d5au	0	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,65
d5fr	0	1	0,33	0,15	0,05	0,67	0,05
d5ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,36	0,95	0,86
d5uk	0	0	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,27
d6au	1	1	1	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,86
d6fr	1	0	0	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,86
d6ge	1	0	0,33	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,86
d6uk	1	1	1	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,86
d7au	1	1	0,67	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,86
d7fr	1	0	0	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,86
d7ge	1	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,95
d7uk	1	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,65
d8au	0	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,05
d8fr	0	0	0,33	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,05

d8ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,05
d8uk	0	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,65
d9au	0	0	0,33	0,65	0,22	0,92	0,86
d9fr	0	0	0,33	0,15	0,98	0,67	0,86
d9ge	0	1	1	0,98	0,61	0,95	0,95
d9uk	0	1	0,33	0,27	0,05	0,14	0,86